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Evidence collected by independent experts indicates Georgian police may have deployed a legacy chemical compound during crowd-control operations in Tbilisi, raising legal and public-safety questions over the force’s compliance with domestic and international standards.
Investigators have identified indications that Georgian police used a World War I-era chemical compound during crowd-control operations in Tbilisi, prompting renewed scrutiny of state compliance with domestic and international standards.
The findings involve protesters, medical professionals, former police officials and independent experts who reported prolonged symptoms after water-cannon exposure.
The incidents were linked to protests that escalated in late 2024 and continued in 2025 in the Georgian capital.
The emerging evidence raised legal questions over whether the substance used meets permitted criteria for riot-control agents or could constitute deployment of a chemical weapon.
The matter involves Georgia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, specialised police units, toxicology experts, and EU institutions after the European Commission confirmed it was aware of the allegations.
Commission spokesperson Anita Hipper stated that the claims, if verified, would be unacceptable and said a swift, transparent and credible investigation is expected.
The issue carries broader implications for public safety, human-rights compliance and accountability in state use of force.
Initial reports from protesters and attending physicians documented persistent respiratory and dermatological symptoms following contact with water-cannon sprays.
Independent medical review indicated that dozens of individuals exhibited effects beyond those associated with conventional irritants such as CS gas.
Two former senior officers from Georgia’s Special Tasks Department stated that water-cannon vehicles previously carried chemical mixtures listed internally as UN1710 and UN3439.
Expert analysis identified UN1710 as trichloroethylene and linked UN3439 to compounds including bromobenzyl cyanide, historically known as camite.
The European Commission acknowledged the media reports, with spokesperson Anita Hipper stating that the allegations, if confirmed, would be unacceptable and that an investigation is expected.
Georgian authorities have rejected the allegations and described the conclusions as unfounded.
The reported use of a legacy compound raises questions about the permissible scope of riot-control agents under both Georgian law and international frameworks.
Courts typically examine whether a substance deployed by police is proportionate, temporary in effect, and used solely to disperse crowds rather than to inflict lasting harm.
If a chemical causes prolonged physiological impact, it may fall outside accepted categories of short-term irritants allowed for law-enforcement purposes.
The situation also touches on procedural duties: documentation of authorised substances, internal approvals for deployment, and oversight mechanisms that ensure compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Issues may arise regarding whether police acted within their operational mandate and whether alternative, less harmful measures were available.
International human-rights frameworks, including those referenced by UN Special Procedures, require that crowd-control measures minimise harm and avoid methods that could amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
Persistent physiological effects reported by demonstrators raise concerns under the UN’s basic principles on the use of force and OSCE guidelines on policing assemblies, which emphasise necessity, proportionality and transparency.
The allegations also intersect with public-health obligations, as chemical exposure affecting large groups engages state responsibilities for medical monitoring, environmental safety and community reassurance.
Law-enforcement agencies ordinarily follow established authorisation pathways that specify approved agents, dilution procedures and supervisory oversight during crowd-control operations.
Internal-affairs units and regulators typically review inventory records, procurement documentation, toxicology assessments and after-action reports.
Where chemical agents are suspected, investigators may conduct digital forensics, examine containers, undertake environmental sampling and cross-reference deployment logs.
Prosecutors may become involved if evidence suggests breaches of use-of-force regulations, misclassification of substances or violations of chemical-control statutes, with international cooperation possible where compounds fall under chemical-weapons monitoring regimes.
Possible exposure to persistent irritants poses direct public-safety risks, particularly for individuals with respiratory or cardiac vulnerabilities.
Allegations of improvised or unregulated chemical mixtures can undermine confidence in policing and heighten tensions around political demonstrations.
Use of atypical agents may increase polarisation, elevate concerns about radicalisation, and prompt questions about the adequacy of safeguards over state equipment and procedures.
There are also implications for oversight bodies tasked with ensuring lawful management of assemblies and protecting the rights of participants.
Available evidence indicates the likely presence of a compound within the UN3439 classification, including bromobenzyl cyanide, historically known as “camite”. This is based on inventory documents, expert assessment, and witness accounts.
Unlike standard riot-control agents with short-term effects, bromobenzyl cyanide is associated with longer-lasting irritation. Legal scrutiny focuses on whether a substance used by police meets accepted thresholds for proportionality and temporary impact.
Reviews usually include chemical sampling of vehicles or equipment, toxicology assessments from medical examinations, and validation of police inventory records. Former officials may also provide corroborating testimony.
Yes. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention and UN crowd-control principles, law-enforcement chemicals must have temporary effects and be used proportionately. Persistent harm may trigger human-rights and compliance reviews.
Authorities typically begin by reviewing operational records, including chemical inventories, deployment authorisations and after-action documentation associated with the protests.
Independent investigators may request toxicological analysis, environmental sampling and medical data to determine whether the substance used aligns with recognised riot-control agents.
Oversight bodies can seek clarification from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and assess whether referral to prosecutors or human-rights mechanisms is warranted.
International partners may also request updates if the allegations relate to treaty obligations or cross-border chemical-weapons controls.
The core legal issue concerns whether the compound deployed meets the standards for permissible law-enforcement agents or falls into the category of prohibited chemical weapons, raising questions about police accountability, public health and compliance with international norms.
As evidence is examined, the emphasis remains on transparency, regulatory oversight and the state’s duty to protect individuals during assemblies, with these frameworks guiding the implications for future crowd-management practices.
